Abstract-Transactive coordination and control has recently emerged as a new methodology to facilitate large-scale integration of various distributed energy resources into power distribution systems. Various transactive energy systems (TESs) are being developed for power system problems involving self-interested asset owners with privacy concerns. However, there has been very limited work on evaluating and comparing their performance. In this paper, a systematic performance evaluation procedure is presented for the comparison among different TESs in terms of their performance under practical conditions such as information uncertainties, network effects, individual rationality, etc. Both quantitative and qualitative performance metrics are proposed. This procedure is then applied to evaluate and compare two existing TESs using the double-auction market. The detailed case studies also illustrate the performance limitations of double-auction-based TESs and provide useful insights on the necessary design improvements for practical applications.
Performance Evaluation for Transactive Energy
Systems Using Double-Auction Market I. INTRODUCTION E LECTRICITY demand has been steadily increasing over the past few decades [1] . In order for electricity supply to keep up with demand, one simple solution for power companies is to build more and more generation facilities. However, planning generation capacity based on peak demand could result in large amount of unused generation capacity when peak demand is increased faster than base demand. On the other hand, largescale integration of renewable energy into the power grid has gradually become one of our nation's missions due to both environmental concerns on greenhouse gas emission and economic requirements on energy sustainability. However, the vast integration of renewable energy into the power grid imposes daunting challenges to the conventional supply-side control paradigm. As pointed out in [2] - [4] , it will substantially increase the need The authors are with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA 99354 USA (e-mail:, jianming.lian@pnnl.gov; huiying.ren@pnnl.gov; yannan.sun@pnnl.gov; donald.hammerstrom@pnnl.gov).
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for operational reserves to absorb the variability and uncertainty of renewable energy and balance supply and demand instantaneously and continuously. If these additional reserves are still required to be provided by conventional generators, it will diminish the net carbon benefit from renewable integration, reduce generation efficiency, and eventually become economically untenable.
Besides the supply-side control, there has been a longstanding interest in using electric loads to assist in managing the balance between supply and demand in power systems, which has been often referred to as the demand-side control. The successful development of communication and computation techniques enables the real-time control of electric loads [5] . When properly coordinated and controlled, the collection of end-use loads can provide various grid services that were traditionally provided by generators only [6] and satisfies the requirement of speed, accuracy and magnitude. Because end-use loads usually have a large population size and fast aggregated ramping rate, the demand-side control present an enormous potential to mitigate the variability and uncertainty introduced by intermittent renewable generation.
A simple form of aggregated load control is the direct load control (DLC), where the aggregator (utility companies, load serving entities, or curtailment service provider) can remotely control end-use loads based on prior mutual financial agreements. Traditional DLC is usually concerned with services such as peak shaving and load shifting only [7] - [9] . The latest development of DLC focuses on modeling and control for a large population of end-use loads such as thermostatically controlled loads [10] - [15] , plug-in electric vehicles [16] , [17] , and data center servers [18] , [19] to provide various grid services including frequency regulation and load following. Some of these DLC approaches require fast communications between the aggregator and individual loads.
Although it can achieve the reliable and accurate aggregated load response, the practical applications of DLC are greatly challenged due to the privacy and security concerns of residential customers. It is usually difficult in practice to obtain those private information that is required for the implementation of DLC approaches. As an alternative to DLC, price responsive control (PRC) sends price signals to end-use loads so that they can individually and voluntarily manage their local demand. In this way, it protects the customer privacy and affects the aggregated demand at the same time. Three common examples of PRC include time of use (TOU) pricing, critical peak pricing (CPP), and real-time pricing (RTP) [20] - [23] . Many validation projects [24] have also been carried out to demonstrate the performance of PRC in terms of payment reduction, load shifting, and power shaving. However, these approaches either directly pass the wholesale energy price to the end users or heuristically modify the wholesale price without taking into account the potential load response resulted from the broadcasted price signals. Therefore, it is usually difficult for PRC to achieve a predictable and reliable aggregated load response that is essential in various demand response applications.
Recently, transactive coordination and control (also referred to as market-based coordination and control) is emerging as a new technology for demand response, where end-use loads are automated and engaged through market-based interaction (see, for example, [25] - [36] ). It borrows ideas from microeconomics [37] into the controller design and therefore is amenable to problems where self-interested customers are coordinated and controlled to deliver desired aggregated load response [38] , [39] . Transactive control shares the same advantage of PRC in preserving customer privacy by using internal price as control signals. However, the internal price is systematically designed according to specific control objectives, which can be dramatically different from the wholesale price (see, for example, [40] , [41] ). Hence, transactive control can also share the advantage of DLC in having more predictable and reliable aggregated load response when compared to PRC.
The GridWise Architecture Council defines transactive energy as a system of economic and control mechanisms that allows the dynamic balance of supply and demand across the entire electrical infrastructure using value as a key operational parameter [42] . Both in the U.S. and Europe, several field demonstration projects have proved the technology feasibility of transactive energy. The Olympic Peninsula Demonstration (2006) (2007) [43] , [44] was the first proof-of-concept demonstration project in the U.S that used the double-auction market for congestion management. Building upon the Olympic Peninsula Demonstration, the AEP gridSMART Demonstration (2010-2014) [45] , [46] incorporated a RTP component. The Pacific Northwest Smart Grid Demonstration (2010-2015) [47] , [48] was another demonstration project in the U.S. that used peer-to-peer negotiation based on market principles to coordinate the operation of distributed energy resources. PowerMatching City (2009-2015) [49] was a demonstration project in Europe that used the double-auction market to manage the balance between supply and demand.
Although many transactive energy systems (TESs) have been proposed in the literature, it is difficult for practitioners to fully understand the underlying limitations of different TESs and compare their performance for practical applications. To evaluate and compare the effectiveness of different TESs, various measures have to be developed to provide informative characteristics of these systems. In this paper, a systematic performance evaluation procedure is proposed for the performance comparison among different TESs, which is currently lacking in the literature. This performance evaluation procedure will be a very valuable tool to assist practitioners in selecting the right TESs to solve their power system problems. The first and also the most important step in the evaluation procedure is to determine quantitative and qualitative performance metrics that are meaningful for TESs under comparison. Some metrics should be common to all TESs, but others could be very unique due to specific control objectives or implementation methods. The next step is to examine the underlying assumptions of these systems and identify those practical conditions that could affect their performance. The final step is to perform simulation studies for comprehensive comparison between different systems with performance results. To illustrate this proposed procedure, two existing TESs using double-auction market ( [43] and [50] ) are evaluated and compared in terms of their performance under practical conditions, such as information uncertainties, individual rationality, network effects, and so on. The detailed case studies also illustrate the performance limitations of existing double-auction-based TESs, and provide useful insights on the necessary design improvements for practical applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, both quantitative and qualitative performance metrics are defined and assessed for performance evaluation and comparison of TESs. Then, two TESs using the double-auction market for congestion management are presented in Section III. Several practical conditions that have to be considered for the performance evaluation of two presented candidate systems are discussed in Section IV. In Section V, different case studies are presented for detailed performance evaluation. Conclusions can be found in Section VI.
II. PERFORMANCE METRICS
The TES is usually concerned with the coordination and control of a group of distributed energy resources such as smart loads, distributed generations, and even energy storage. It can be modeled by a multi-agent system with three different types of agents: coordinator, supplier, and customer, where the coordinator represents the market operator, the supplier is the electricity seller, and the customer is the electricity buyer. The underlying coordination and control have a hierarchical structure as shown in Fig. 1 , which consists of two decision-making levels including resource level and supervisory level. The resource control occurs at the resource level during the real time. The resource coordination occurs once every coordination period at the supervisory level. The length of coordination period, often referred to as the market period, is a design parameter. The optimal coordination among individual resources is achieved by market clearing prices to ensure both global and local objectives. The market clearing can be implemented in a hierarchical or distributed manner. With the hierarchical clearing, which is usually referred to as double auction, individual resources submit their bids to the coordinator, and then the coordinator clears the market once and for all. With the distributed clearing, the coordinator first broadcasts a price to individual resources for them to report their local quantities, and then the coordinator updates the broadcasted price until it converges.
For evaluating and comparing the performance of different TESs, appropriate criteria should first be developed for a meaningful analysis. Because the transactive energy system incorporates market principles into the resource coordination and control, there are some metrics that are generally applicable to both hierarchical and distributed market designs. However, there are also some metrics that are only applicable to the distributed market design. In the following, both quantitative and qualitative performance metrics are defined for any TESs.
A. Quantitative Metrics
The objective of any transactive energy system can be commonly formulated as an optimization problem of maximizing social welfare of the entire system subject to certain global constraints (feeder capacity limit, aggregated load following, etc.) for each market cycle. Hence, the first metric is social welfare ($) achieved at each market cycle, which quantifies the optimality of derived control solutions. It is defined as the difference between the total utility due to energy consumption of individual customers and the total cost due to energy generation of individual suppliers, that is,
where U i (·) is the utility function, C j (·) is the cost function, p i is the average power consumption, p j is the average power generation, N L is the number of customers, and N G is the number of suppliers. When two different TESs can both respect the global constraints, the one with higher social welfare will be better than the other. The next metric is violation level for each market cycle, which measures the severity of violating global constraints. The unit of violation level may vary according to the physical quantities involved. Consider the transactive energy system designed for feeder congestion management, where the global constraint is imposed by the feeder capacity limit, that is, the total feeder power should be less than the feeder capacity limit. In this case, the violation level (kW) is defined as the amount of power exceeding the capacity limit, that is,
where p i is the average power consumption of controllable loads, N is the number of controllable loads, p uc is the average power consumption of uncontrollable loads, and D is the feeder capacity limit. Furthermore, the violation level can also be expressed as a percentage of the feeder capacity limit,
which is sometimes more convenient and informative. The third metric is algorithmic complexity for each market cycle, which characterizes the properties of and measures the amount of resources required by the underlying algorithm of the deployed market design to derive the market clearing price. For TESs with hierarchical clearing, communication bandwidth and computational time or storage are commonly considered as the measures for algorithmic complexity. For TESs with distributed clearing, solution convergence and convergence rate are two additional measures exclusively considered for algorithmic complexity.
Besides those metrics defined in the above over a single market cycle, the following three quantitative metrics defined over multiple market cycles can also provide useful insights by examining the control performance from cycle to cycle.
The first one is total social welfare ($), which represents the total social welfare over an extended period of time. It is defined as the total sum of SW for individual cycles, that is,
where k is the market cycle index and T is the number of market cycles. The second one is price volatility index ($/kWh), which reflects the degree of fluctuation in market clearing prices. It is defined as the root mean square (RMS) value of the differences between any two consecutive market clearing prices over an extended period of time, that is,
where λ clear is the market clearing prices for individual cycles. The larger PVI implies higher price volatility. The third one is load volatility index (kW), which reflects the degree of fluctuation in aggregated responses of controllable loads. It is defined as the RMS value of the differences between any two consecutive aggregated load responses over an extended period of time, that is,
This metric also indicates the possibility of load synchronization, that is, the larger LVI implies higher possibility.
B. Qualitative Metrics
The comprehensive performance analysis should include not only quantitative but also qualitative metrics, which describe the performance of TESs from different perspectives. Usually, qualitative metrics are concerned with those perspectives that cannot be fully described by pure numbers. However, qualitative analysis often relies on the calculation of quantitative metrics under different scenarios. For TESs, scalability and robustness are two important qualitative metrics.
Scalability describes the implementation difficulty of a TES when applied to large-scale systems. The analysis of scalability can be achieved by examining how the required communication bandwidth and computational power, that is, algorithmic complexity, will change as the system size grows. A TES is referred to be scalable if the system size does not have large impact on the required communication bandwidth, while, at the same time, the underlying algorithm can be run in polynomial time.
Robustness indicates the capability of a TES in maintaining the desired performance under various practical conditions that were not taken into account during the market design. In fact, the analysis of robustness can be achieved by examining how the values of individual quantitative metrics will change in the presence of a given condition. A TES is said to be robust to certain practical conditions if the corresponding performance degradation is negligible.
C. Performance Assessment
The quantitative and qualitative metrics proposed above can be grouped into three categories. The first category includes social welfare, total social welfare and price volatility index, which quantitatively describe the performance of TESs from the financial perspective. The second category includes violation level, algorithmic complexity and load synchronization index, which quantitatively describe the performance of TESs from the control perspective. The third category includes scalability and robustness, which qualitatively describe the practical suitability of TESs for the implementation perspective. Depending on the specific performance to be evaluated and compared, the practitioners can select the appropriate performance metrics accordingly.
Although the metric social welfare directly captures the financial performance of TESs, it may not be used directly as it is. When any of the global constraints is violated, it is possible to end up with higher SW than the maximum without violation. Thus, the metrics SW and V L may have to be considered simultaneously in order for a fair comparison between two TESs. One simple but effectively way of reflecting their trade-offs in practice is to penalize SW by V L, which leads to the metric, adjusted social welfare ($), defined as
where ω is a weighting factor for the system violations. It can be seen that different values of ω will lead to different ASW . Hence, the value of ω should be selected based on the specific practical applications, and it is totally up to the preference of the practitioner performing this analysis. The larger the weighting factor is, the lower the tolerance of violation is. At the same time, total social welfare can also be penalized by violation levels over an extended period of time, which leads to the metric total adjusted social welfare ($). It is defined as the total sum of ASW for individual cycles, that is,
Note that both T SW and T ASW can be used for performance evaluation but may not be appropriate for performance comparison of TESs for which the coordination is only considered over a single market cycle instead of multiple cycles.
III. DOUBLE-AUCTION-BASED TRANSACTIVE SYSTEM
In this section, two TESs using double-auction market as proposed in [43] (referred to as Approach One) and [50] (referred to as Approach Two) are briefly described. Both TESs were proposed to coordinate residential air conditioners (ACs) on the same feeder through a five-minute double-auction market so that the total feeder power can be controlled below the capacity limit. Hence, the resource level consists of residential ACs. The feeder coordinator at the supervisory level represents a double-auction market. At the beginning of every market cycle, individual ACs submit their bids to the feeder coordinator by taking into account local constraints and objectives. The coordinator collects all the bidding information and then determines the clearing price to achieve the system-level objectives. This clearing price is then broadcast back to the device layer as the coordination signal. After receiving the clearing price, individual ACs determine local control inputs independently for the current market cycle.
The residential AC has two operating modes including ON and OFF. As illustrated by Fig. 2 , the switching between two operating modes is fully dictated by an indoor air temperature setpoint T set and a deadband [−δ/2, δ/2] centered around it. When the indoor air temperature rises beyond the upper deadband, the AC turns ON to provide cool air so that the indoor air temperature will decrease. When it drops below the lower deadband, the AC turns OFF and then the indoor air temperature will rise again. Hence, the indoor air temperature oscillates around the setpoint within the deadband. The dynamics of the AC can be described by the following equivalent thermal parameter (ETP) model [15] with both discrete and continuous states,Ṫ with
where T a , is the indoor air temperature, T m is the inner mass temperature (due to the building materials and furnishings), U a is the conductance of the building envelope, T o is the outdoor air temperature, H m is the conductance between the inner air and inner solid mass, C a is the thermal mass of the air, C m is the thermal mass of the building materials and furnishings, Q is the total heat flux consisting of the heat gain from the internal load Q i , the solar heat gain Q s and the heat gain from the heating/cooling system Q h , and q(t) denotes the operating mode of the AC with q(t) = 1 when it is ON and q(t) = 0 when it is OFF. The discrete state q(t) is controlled by a hysteretic controller defined as
The indoor air temperature setpoint T set of each AC is used as the local control inputs. It is updated inside the thermostat every five minutes in response to the received market clearing price. The mapping from the clearing price λ min to the new temperature setpoint T set is specified by the local control response curve as shown in Fig. 3 , which is determined by several parameters. The parameters λ avg and σ are the average and variance, respectively, of the market clearing prices over a period of time in the past. They can be easily done by adding memory to the thermostat so that it can keep track of the historical clearing prices. The parameters T desired , T min , and T max are directly specified by users, where T desired is the desired indoor air temperature setpoint, and T min and T max are the lower and upper bounds of the acceptable indoor air temperature setpoint. The parameter k > 0 is completely abstracted from the household owners preference of indoor air temperature setpoint over the electricity price, which is reflected through a user interface as shown in Fig. 4 . For example, when k is very large, the response curve becomes an almost vertical line at T desired . This implies that the household owner is very sensitive to the indoor air temperature, and would like to maintain the indoor air temperature setpoint at T desired regardless of the clearing price. When k is very small and close to zero, the response curve becomes an almost horizontal line at λ avg . This implies that the household owner is very sensitive to the electricity price, and is willing to sacrifice indoor comfort for cost saving.
A. Approach One
In Approach One, the bid submitted by each AC consist of two quantities. One is the bidding price λ bid determined by the current room temperature T c and the control response curve as shown in Fig. 5 . The other one is the bidding quantity P bid that is equal to the maximum average power when the AC is ON for the entire market cycle. The market clearing strategy is to determine the intersection between the aggregated demand curve and the supply curve as shown in Fig. 6 , where P uc denotes the forecasted average power of uncontrollable loads. When there is no congestion, the clearing price will be equal to the base price. When there is congestion, the clearing price will be higher than the base price so that the total demand can be capped by the feeder capacity limit D.
B. Approach Two
In Approach Two, the bidding strategy is improved for individual ACs so that their bids can reflect their actual demand more accurately. In fact, for any given indoor air temperature setpoint, the energy consumption for the coming market cycle can be calculated based on the thermal dynamics as described by (9) and the current indoor air temperature. On the other hand, for any given market clearing price, the temperature setpoint can be determined from the local control response curve. By considering these two relationships in a composite way, the relationship between the clearing price and the energy consumption is obtained for the coming market cycle. An example of such a relationship for a residential AC is given in Fig. 7 . Note that P min may be greater than zero, and P max may be smaller than the maximum average power when the AC is fully ON. That is, the AC may not be able to be OFF or ON for the entire coming market cycle depending on the distance between the current indoor air temperature and the temperature deadband. It can be seen that this demand curve is continuous and non-increasing with respect to the market clearing price. When the market clearing price is high, the residential AC tends to reduce the energy consumption in order to save money. When the market clearing price is low, it tends to consume more energy so that it can save money by pre-cooling the indoor air.
It is shown in [50] that under the assumption of competitive market, the optimal bidding strategy is for individual ACs to submit their demand curves directly. However, it will require significant amount of communication bandwidth to submit the entire demand curve. Therefore, a practical bidding strategy proposed therein is to submit the parameters characterizing a step approximation of the demand curve as illustrated by Fig. 8 . Note that the bidding quantity P bid now consists of two numbers P min and P max .
Remark 1: Note that the inverse function of the demand curve is actually the derivative of the utility function. Thus, the utility function can be always determined as
where λ = h −1 (p) denotes the inverse demand function. 
IV. PRACTICAL CONDITIONS
For double-auction-based TESs, it is very important to take into account the following practical conditions for the evaluation of their performance in practice. As will be illustrated later in Section V, these conditions could significantly impact their control performance.
The first practical condition is the forecast error of uncontrollable loads. In order to construct the aggregated demand curve for market clearing as shown in Fig. 6 , it is required to forecast the average power of uncontrollable loads for the coming market cycle. However, it is barely feasible in practice to obtain an accurate forecast.
The second practical condition is the imperfect communication network. The implementation of double-auction-based TESs relies heavily on the communication between responsive loads and the coordinator. The controller design usually assumes a perfect communication network that is fast and accurate enough for information exchange. However, the communication network in practice can never be perfect. The most common effects associated with an imperfect communication network include delay, packet drop, and even quantization errors. Unless systematically considered in the controller design, these effects will inevitably affect the performance of transactive control systems.
The third practical condition is the imperfect competition. The bidding and clearing strategies in the above have been derived by assuming a completely competitive market. However, the complete competitiveness can only be guaranteed in practice if there is a very large number of market participants. In this case, individual participants have very little of no market power to influence the clearing price. When the number of participants is limited, there is a chance that those participants with large market power can manipulate the market clearing prices for their own benefits.
In order to improve the applicability of double-auction-based TESs, it is necessary to examine the impacts of the above practical conditions on the control performance, identify the corresponding performance limitations, and quantify the associated performance degradation.
V. CASE STUDIES
In this section, detailed simulation studies are considered to analyze the performance of Approach One and Two presented in Section III. The simulation results clearly identify their performance limitations and demonstrate the necessity of future design improvements for practical applications.
A. Simulation Setup
The simulation scenario considers the real-time operation of a distribution feeder for a hot summer day. There are 1000 residential ACs under the feeder, which are all equipped with smart thermostats to measure the indoor air temperature and to communicate with the coordinator. The parameters for the ETP models are derived from GridLAB-D, an agent-based simulation framework for smart grid [51] , by using the realistic values of various building parameters such as floor area, ceiling height, glass type, glazing layers and material, area per floor and etc. The rated power of ACs are uniformly distributed between 2.5 kW and 5.0 kW. The average power of uncontrollable loads P uc is fixed at 12 MW for the purpose of simplicity in illustration, and the feeder capacity limit D is selected to be 15 MW. The weather data and the Typical Meteorological Year (TMY) data are obtained for Columbus, OH from [52] and [53] , respectively, which include the outdoor air temperatures and the solar gains. The energy price data λ base is derived from PJM's wholesale energy market [54] and modified to a retail rate plus a retail modifier as defined by AEP's tariff [55] .
B. Performance Comparison
In this case study, Approach One is compared to Approach Two in terms of their effectiveness in maintaining the total feeder power below the capacity limit by coordinating ACs through a five-minute double-auction market. The aggregated power of ACs under both approaches is shown in Fig. 9 . It can be seen that Approach One fails to control the total feeder power below the capacity limit very seriously when the outdoor air temperature is high in the afternoon. The comparison of T SW and T ASW over one day between both approaches is summarized in Table I . It can be seen that Approach One has a higher T SW than Approach Two, which actually results from the violation of feeder capacity limit. Such a violation implies more power consumption during feeder congestion, which inevitably leads to higher social welfare. However, the feeder power violation under Approach One is so severe that it has a much lower T ASW than that of Approach Two even when the weighting factor ω is selected to be the minimum of $ 0.01/kW as shown in Fig. 10 . Therefore, Approach Two performs better than Approach One in general by effectively managing feeder congestion.
Approach One and Two use the same double-auction market for resource coordination through bidding and clearing, so they should have the same scalability when applied to largescale systems. Note that the double-auction market implements market clearing through the central coordinator in a hierarchical manner. Hence, the required communication bandwidth will increase proportionally to the system size if there is only one coordinator to be considered. In this case, the bandwidth of the communication network adopted in practice will solely determine the maximum size of the systems to which both approaches can be applied, which makes them unscalable for very large-scale systems. On the other hand, the algorithm for market clearing under the double-auction market as shown in Fig. 6 has low complexity. It can be easily shown that the time to run the algorithm varies as a polynomial function of the system size. Hence, both approaches can clear the market in a fast manner even for very large-scale systems. In order to effectively improve the scalability of both approaches, it is necessary to perform hierarchical system decomposition by introducing more coordinators so that the required communication bandwidth will not depend on the overall size of the systems under consideration.
In the following subsections, the robustness of TESs with the double-auction market will be analyzed under various practical conditions, where only Approach Two is considered herein for the illustrating purpose.
C. Impact of Forecast Error
In this case study, the impact of forecast error of uncontrollable loads on the performance of Approach Two is analyzed. The change of the adjusted social welfare with respect to the levels of forecast error is shown in Fig. 11 . It can be seen that the inaccuracy in load forecasting inevitably affects the optimality of Approach Two and thus reduces the associated social welfare. Furthermore, it can also be seen that the impact resulted from load over-forecasting is less severe than that of under-forecasting. This is because load under-forecasting will inevitably lead to feeder power congestion and impose penalty on the associated social welfare.
D. Impact of Packet Loss
In this case study, the impact of packet loss caused by imperfect communication network (usually, network congestion) on the performance of Approach Two is analyze. This issue will become evident when the number of market participants becomes large. When the submitted bidding information gets lost in the network, the coordinator has two different ways to handle this situation. One way is to simply assume that those affected ACs choose not to participate into this market cycle and then consider them as uncontrollable loads. The other way is to use their bidding information from the previous market cycle as a replacement for this market cycle. The change of the adjusted social welfare with respect to the packet drop rates is shown in Fig. 12 . It can be seen that the replacement of lost bidding information actually increase the robustness of Approach Two to packet loss.
E. Impact of Imperfect Competition
For both Approach One and Two, individual market participants have been assumed to be price takers. In other words, none of them has larger market power than the others to manipulate the market clearing price. However, this assumption is only approximately valid if the number of participants is very large, and is usually not valid in practice. Hence, it turns out that any participants with higher power consumption will have larger market power that enables them to manipulate the market clearing price. In this case study, the impact of imperfect competition resulted from unequal market power among individual market participants on the performance of Approach Two is analyzed. In particular, the capability of a single AC in playing the market for its own benefits is demonstrated with respect to different power consumption levels. This study is performed during a market cycle when feeder congestion occurs. The selected AC intentionally submits a bidding price that is 10% less than the true value determined from the demand curve. By doing so, the selected AC would like to lower the market clearing price so that it can consume more energy to increase the surplus. Nevertheless, this is achieved by scarifying the benefits of the coordinator with decreased surplus. It can be seen from Fig. 13 that with larger power consumption level, the selected AC has larger market power to lower the market clearing price for higher surplus. 
F. Impact of User Preference
In this case study, the impact of user preference characterized by the parameter k as shown in Fig. 3 on the performance of Approach Two is analyzed. In this study, the parameter k is assumed to follow a normal distribution with standard deviation of 0.1, and different mean values between 1 and 60 are considered. The change of price and load volatilities with respect to the mean values of k is shown in Fig. 14 . It can be seen that when all the household owners are very sensitive to electricity prices, the volatility of market clearing prices will inevitably increase, which could potentially lead to the high risk of load synchronization. Therefore, appropriate mechanisms should be additionally developed to ensure the smooth price and load responses.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a general systematic performance evaluation procedure with both quantitative and qualitative metrics was proposed for various TESs. This procedure was then applied to analyze and compare the performance of two existing doubleauction-based TESs by taking into account different practical conditions such as information uncertainties, network effects, individual rationality and so on. The comprehensive simulation studies clearly identified the performance limitations of TESs using double-auction market and demonstrated the necessity of future design improvements for practical applications.
